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THE 1992 SECESSION MOVEMENT IN 
SOUTHWEST KANSAS 
PETER J. McCORMICK 
In May of 1992 the Kansas state legislature 
approved and Governor Joan Finney signed 
into law a new school finance formula that 
adversely affected several southwest Kansas 
counties. The new bill provided for a blanket 
mill levy of 32 mills ($32 in taxes for every 
$1000 assessed valuation) to be spread across 
the state. It also restricted funding to a maxi-
mum of $3600 per student. The effects in the 
southwest were drastic. Many districts there, 
accustomed to setting their own tax rates and 
to retaining all monies collected, spent up-
ward of $5000 per student on tax levies below 
20 mills. With the new formula, taxes col-
lected from the 32 mills in excess of the $3600 
per-student limit would have to be released to 
Peter]. McCormick is aPh.D. student in geography at 
the University of Oklahoma. 
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the state for disbursement. Alarmed south-
west Kansans feared that local teachers would 
lose their jobs, courses would be cut, and some 
schools might be forced to close. It was ap-
parent that the state legislature in far away 
Topeka had passed a measure that threatened 
the region. 
In reaction to this tax, termed "selective" 
by many High Plains dwellers, talk of leaving 
the state materialized in an area roughly bound 
by Tribune, Great Bend, Coldwater, and 
Elkhart (Fig. 1). This rural, remote place, 
blessed with some of the richest farm land and 
largest mineral resources in the United States, 
has always been distinct from the rest of the 
state. Wheat, cattle, irrigation, and natural 
gas have provided a large tax base, which, in 
turn, has allowed the area to provide its rela-
tively few citizens with excellent services on 
very low tax levies. Community buildings, 
roads, and schools are modern and well-kept. 
People identify with their school and towns 
thrive on school activities. The schools have 
provided well above average teacher salaries 
and sometimes pioneering educational services 
while accumulating large emergency funds. 
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FIG. 1. Location of the several communities and counties of southwest Kansas affiliated with the 1992 secession 
movement. Shaded counties approved non-binding referendums to secede from the state. 
The school finance formula rekindled cen-
tury-old feelings of resentment and disloca-
tion in regard to the state government and 
eastern Kansas. In the heart of southwest Kan-
sas petitions signed by hundreds reached 
county commissioners within a matter of days 
after the proposal of the school tax plan. 
Kearny Countians, numbering just 4000 total, 
produced more than 500 valid signatures ad-
vocating secession. Headlines in local weekly 
papers talked of the tax, its implications, and 
the secession movement throughout the early 
months of 1992. Larger regional papers, such 
as the Garden City Telegram and The Hutch-
inson News, echoed the same refrain. The sign 
"To Hell With Topeka, Let's Secede" wel-
comed travelers on US Highway 50 at Lakin's 
Ken Ark Motel. The idea was widely supported, 
as reflected in the Kearny County petitions 
and similar petitions in Stevens and Morton 
counties. 
The issue soon materialized into a grass-
roots political movement. Kearny, Stevens, 
and Morton counties were the first to take 
action, holding non-binding advisory votes on 
the question of secession. High voter turnouts 
in all of these places revealed a remarkable 
depth of sentiment against the state govern-
ment. Morton Countians, in the most south-
western extreme of the state, urged secession 
by a 1141-148 vote. Stevens and Kearny coun-
ties produced equally disproportionate totals. 
Election clerks in Hugoton counted 1469 votes 
for and 73 against; in Lakin the vote was 1036 
to 290. 1 The three initial tests were soon fol-
lowed by votes in Grant, Haskell, Hodgemen, 
Kiowa, Meade, and Stanton counties. The anti-
tax, pro-school sentiment prompted a coali-
tion of business people, city councilors, local 
legislators, farmers, county commissioners, and 
many others to call for the creation of the 
"51st State." 
HISTORICAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT 
The roots of the secession movement lie in 
the strong allegiance citizens of this area have 
to their schools, counties, and region. When 
the state of Kansas suggested taking control of 
local institutions it set off an alarm, crystalliz-
ing a previously amorphous regional identity. 
Arguing for secession was a means of, and a 
vehicle for, expressing this identity. Economic 
promise and historical isolation from the rest 
of the state have developed an attitude of self-
sufficiency in southwest Kansas. The inhabit-
ants of the area live on land that was once 
termed desert, that frequently experiences 
drought, and that produced the Dust Bowl. It 
is also a place that has become prosperous-
evident in the high land values assigned it for 
tax purposes. 
Geographic and historical isolation sepa-
rate the southwest from the northern and east-
ern parts of the state. The late arrival of 
railroads and the ominous physiography of sand 
hills and sharp escarpments mean that the 
southwest was the last area of the state to be 
settled. During the drought of the 1890s, it 
was also the first region in Kansas to be aban-
doned. Subsequent settlement of the region 
was markedly distinguished from that of the 
state as a whole. The good grazing attracted 
ranchers from the extreme southern limits of 
the state rather than farmers. They were ac-
companied by settlers from the South, par-
ticularly Missouri, Tennessee, and Kentucky. 
The rest of Kansas had generally been settled 
by those of a more northern heritage-many 
from Iowa, Illinois, and Massachusetts, for 
example. European settlement in the south-
west was also much less significant than in 
other areas of Kansas. Scandinavian, German, 
and Russian settlers, for example, had exten-
sively settled the central and northwestern 
portions of the state, but they rarely settled 
south of the Arkansas River. 2 
Mexican migrants have also had a marked 
influence on southwestern Kansas. During the 
1920s hundreds of Mexican families migrated 
to places such as Garden City and Lakin to 
work sugar beet factories and fields watered by 
irrigation ditches. 1 Recent migrations to the 
southwest corner of the state have reinforced 
the importance of the Mexican-American 
culture in the region. 4 This Hispanic element 
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assures important cultural ties to places south 
and west of Kansas. 
Contemporary southwest Kansas remains 
distinct and isolated. Grant County, the heart 
of the area, lies hundreds of miles, a good half-
day drive, from Topeka, Wichita, or Kansas 
City. Many counties on the western fringe are 
serviced by out-of-state television and radio 
stations. The Rocky Mountain News, Denver 
Post, and the Daily Oklahoman lie alongside, 
or in place of, the Wichita Eagle and The 
Hutchinson News in local stores. The Kansas 
City Star and Topeka Capital-Journal are for-
eign. The original boundary between Moun-
tain Time and Central Time was the 100th 
Meridian, which runs through Dodge City. At 
one time, most of southwest Kansas kept time 
an hour earlier than the rest of the state. State 
universities are missing from the area. The 
closest regent's school is Fort Hays State Uni-
versity, more than a three-hour drive from 
Ulysses. The University of Kansas and Kan-
sas State University lie far to the east, and 
schools such as West Texas A&M, Oklahoma 
Panhandle State, Southern Colorado, and 
even Colorado at Boulder are more proxi-
mate to the High Plains than are the Kansas 
schools. 
The contemporary regional identity of the 
area may also be influenced by images of fel-
low Kansans to the east. People from opposite 
ends of the state have less-than-positive atti-
tudes about each other. Westerners enjoy their 
distinctions, and any attempt by eastern Kan-
sans to meddle in their business is met "with 
scorn and resentment. They feel neglected by 
the government, looked down upon by the 
cities, and ridiculed by everyone.'" To be 
looked down upon by your fellow state resi-
dents is reason enough to start looking for 
other options. Life on the High Plains is nota-
bly different from that in the Kaw Valley and 
the Salt Plains of central Kansas. Kansas is 
known widely as a midwestern state,6 but it 
can be asserted that the High Plains of west-
ern Kansas are not wholly a part of this per-
ception. There is frequent association in the 
southwest corner with the Dust Bowl and an 
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even stronger identification with the "High 
Plains." Surveys also reveal a general decline 
in midwestern allegiance in the region, and 
"the term High Plains may carry meaning to 
its residents beyond mere physical descrip-
tion.") 
Talk of secession and feelings of disloca-
tion from the rest of the state are not new in 
the southwest; given the many regional differ-
ences this is not surprising. In 1892 the Kearny 
County Advocate published an editorial pro-
posing the creation of a state of "West Kansas" 
that would extend between the 1 OOth and 
104th meridian, and would stretch south from 
the Kansas-Nebraska line to include No-Man's 
land (Oklahoma Panhandle) and northeast-
ern New Mexico (Fig. 2). According to the 
editorialist, "We favor the creation of a West 
Kansas for the reason that [the above area] is 
a scope of territory that is actuated by one 
common impulse. There would be no divi-
sion of interests throughout the state, there 
would be a community of interest." The edi-
torial was only a suggestion, and no social 
movement followed. It did, however, define 
a state on and of the High Plains and reverber-
ate with a tune that would become familiar: 
"Western Colorado has no sympathy for East-
ern Colorado, and Eastern Kansas has no sym-
pathy for Western Kansas .... " The editor 
added that the only sympathy the eastern half 
of Kansas had with the west was in taxes. He 
noted that "we certainly have paid enough on 
their capitol building to satisfy our eastern 
brethren. "8 
By the late nineteenth century an infant 
southwest Kansas had distinguished itself from 
the rest of the state, and ties with Topeka 
have been quite tenuous ever since. When-
ever the state government has implemented 
policy that adversely affects the region, the 
old unrest quickly surfaces. In the early 1980s 
the southwest was angered by the severance 
tax on minerals, nearly 80 percent of which 
comes from natural gas-blessed southwest 
Kansas. 9 A former state senator from the re-
gion, Leroy Hayden, commenting on the re-
gional discord stirred up by the tax, noted 
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FIG. 2. Area suggested by Kearny County Advo-
catefor inclusion in an 1892 state of West Kansas. 
that "There's always been a feeling [in south-
west Kansas] of 'Why don't we do something 
on our own?' "10 The severance tax issue did 
not garner enough allegiance for a social 
movement, however, so it was not until 1992, 
and the issues of school taxes and control, 
that the citizenry of the area came together 
and called for change. 
THE POLITICIZA TION OF AN IDEA 
The 1992 movement was much more in-
volved and determined than previous grum-
blings. The drive sought partners in adjoining 
areas, inviting government leaders from coun-
ties in the Oklahoma panhandle, eastern 
FIG. 3. Areas of Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, and Texas considered in the 1992 creation 
ofa51stState. 
Colorado, northeastern New Mexico, and the 
Texas panhandle to discuss the issue (Fig. 3). 
These High Plains areas have much in com-
mon with southwest Kansas. Their economies 
are built on oil, gas, wheat, cattle, and irriga-
tion. They are all remote from the govern-
ment and population centers of their states. 
For example, Ulysses is nearly 370 miles by 
road from Topeka; Guymon is 265 miles from 
Oklahoma City; Springfield is 255 miles from 
Denver; and Dalhart is 560 miles from Austin. 
Being treated like a sometimes forgotten, some-
times exploited stepchild is a familiar experi-
ence in all regions. Citizens of Oklahoma's 
farthest western reach, Cimarron County, have 
complained for years; in the Texas panhandle, 
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a legislator proposed a local secession of 
twenty-six counties just one month before the 
movement in Kansas began.!! 
Leaders of the citizen's coalition who envi-
sioned a new state met on 17 March 1992 at 
Garden City's Hilton Inn with delegates rep-
resenting twenty-seven counties from Kansas, 
Colorado, and Oklahoma. The initial meet-
ing defined the grievances the southwestern 
Kansans had against the lawmakers in Topeka. 
Many had expected the meeting to material-
ize into a "rallying call to mount the barri-
cades and create a brave new 51st State,"12 but 
to the dismay of the radicals, it was only a 
forum for slinging mud from one end of Kansas 
to the other. Complaints that the rural, south-
west schools would have to support the larger, 
poorer districts in the east dominated conver-
sation. 
Taxation was the focus of the Kansans' dis-
content. The immediate school issue reminded 
people of the severance tax grievances of the 
1980s. Speakers noted that secession would 
deny more than $70 million dollars in oil and 
gas revenue to the Kansas state coffers. Others 
pointed out that area residents were being 
caught in political moves controlled by other 
Kansans, not themselves. Loss of control of 
school administration and school taxing re-
mained the dominant issues for Kansans, but 
they did not gain any significant allegiance 
from counties from bordering states. With a 
purely Kansas dispute at the heart of the move-
ment, a larger and nobler idea, that of an inde-
pendent political entity representative of the 
High Plains, was discarded very quickly de-
spite its potential. A Cimarron County com-
missioner reiterated that "We're interested and 
we think our people would be interested."13 
The short-lived attempt at secession in Texas 
and the continued feelings of dislocation in 
Colorado and New Mexico could easily have 
been tapped. 
While southwest Kansans were losing out-
side co-conspirators, within the Sunflower 
State Robert Stephan, state attorney general, 
argued that the movement was unconstitu-
tional and had no chance of succeeding. As he 
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told the press in March 1992, "You could pe-
tition the good Lord himself to secede, but it 
would be an exercise in futility."14 He main-
tained that neither the statehouse nor the U.S. 
Congress would give the consent to secession 
that was mandatory for the creation of a new 
state out of parts of one or several existing 
states. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
Despite setbacks, the movement trudged 
on in communities such as Rolla, Deerfield, 
and Sublette, where the general public and 
politicians joined committees to plan for the 
new state. Several meetings during the spring 
and summer of 1992 outlined grievances in 
detail and formulated constitutional propos-
als. By the end of the summer, a constitution-
al convention was set for 11 September in 
Ulysses. 
On 11 September 1992 seven hard-core 
counties were represented at the convention: 
Haskell, Hodgeman, Kiowa, Meade, Morton, 
Stanton, and Stevens. Two others, Kearny 
County and Grant County, home of the con-
vention, backed out in fear of legal implica-
tions. Others, such as Wichita and Seward, 
expressed interest, but made no formal asso-
ciation. Though the beacon of secession that 
had dominated the airwaves and newspapers 
on the High Plains now only seemed a flicker, 
the small delegation in Ulysses were deter-
mined. They voted on a new state name: West 
Kansas, a state bird: the pheasant, and a state 
flower: the yucca. They made a list of formal 
grievances to be sent to Governor Joan 
Finney.15 
The meeting also produced the basics of a 
constitution and the proposed secession pe-
tition to the State of Kansas. The constitu-
tion addressed the contemporary discontent 
with the American political system and many 
of the issues found in the secession movement. 
It limited elected officials to two terms, al-
lowed free secession, called for a balanced 
budget, banned exemptions from property tax, 
gave the governor line item veto power, and 
provided for a two house legislature, one house 
based on population (no more than 5000 per 
district), the other on geographic area, prob-
ably county.16 
The attempts to develop a "West Kansas" 
petition for separation were even more re-
markable than the constitution. Kenneth 
Lester, a Hugoton delegate, moved "that this 
body continue their effort to support the for-
mation of a 51st State and present a petition 
to the Kansas legislature in 1993." He contin-
ued that "If the legislature vetoes our petition 
to become a new state, then a new ballot should 
be submitted to the voters of each county to 
determine if the committee [for a new state] 
shall proceed."17 A formal petition for se-
cession was never presented to the Kansas 
legislature. During the early stages of the 
movement Representative Gene Shore of 
Stanton County had proposed an amendment 
in the House of Representatives that would 
make secession constitutional, but few legis-
lators recognized the earnestness of Shore and 
the southwest counties, so the measure was 
defeated handily, 25 to 82. Most members 
"took Shore's proposal as a joke and milled 
about the chamber, chuckling over it."18 A 
second attempt by Shore would likely have 
met the same response. 
BOYCOTTS AND LAWSUITS 
The lack of a petition for secession, a con-
stitutional amendment, or even interest in 
seeking the second advisory poll, as outlined 
by the constitutional convention, showed the 
cause of West Kansas to be futile. Southwest 
Kansans, however, remained determined and 
sought alternative ways to protect their 
schools, including economic boycotts and law-
suits. 
To defend themselves against the new for-
mula for school finance and to protest other 
economic and social discrimination southwest 
Kansans perceived had been heaped upon 
them, leaders in the region threatened to re-
tain all school tax, severance tax, and sales 
tax collections. The millions of dollars the 
counties would retain would place the state in 
a financial bind. Attorney General Stephan 
proclaimed that "local officials don't have the 
authority to withhold taxes due the state and, 
while they can do whatever they want to do, 
it's not going to last for very long."19 He warned 
that he would move to oust public officials 
who retained tax revenues. Many local citi-
zens and businesses countered by paying their 
property taxes in protest, a legal action in 
Kansas that in effect sets up something like 
an escrow account and hinders the state's ac-
cess to the funds. While the effects of this 
widely accepted form of dissent have not been 
measured, large companies such as Colorado 
Interstate Gas, as well as many private indi-
viduals, protested their taxes. 
Southwest Kansas counties also passed 
resolutions to boycott counties represented 
by legislators who had voted for the school 
finance package. Morton County, in the first 
such ordinance, in early May 1992, proclaimed 
that it would "no longer buy any equipment 
or do business with those areas represented 
by Senators and Representatives who voted 
to kill Southwest Kansas.,>2Q Grant and Kearny 
counties followed with similar resolutions, tar-
geting Garden City, Dodge City, Wichita, Hut-
chinson, and even Kansas City and Topeka. 
The counties of southwest Kansas would now 
do their business elsewhere. 
Though it might seem that an economic 
boycott would have little chance at success, 
the southwestern counties spend heavily on 
equipment and construction projects, sending 
millions of dollars to other regions of the state. 
Boycotters would now direct their money to 
local businesses or to companies in surround-
ing states. Lamar, Amarillo, and Colorado 
Springs, would get an even greater share of 
the market. Garden City and Dodge City, re-
gional trade centers whose representatives had 
voted for the school finance bill, were prime 
targets for the boycotts. The county boycotts 
were followed by several city resolutions and a 
general grass-roots determination not to trade 
with the areas of Kansas that supported school 
finance reform. 21 
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Protestors added legal action against the 
new finance formula to tax protests and boy-
cotts. Nine southwest Kansas school districts 
formed a coalition, Kansans for Local Con-
trol, later the Kansas Education Coalition. The 
group complained that the new school finance 
formula was "unconstitutional and that the 
management of school systems by local school 
districts has been an integral part of Kansas 
life and education" and filed suit in Shawnee 
County District Court. 22 Their case was placed 
alongside suits involving the Blue Valley and 
Burlington school districts, both also adversely 
affected by the formula. When the Kansas su-
preme court ruled the funding formula consti-
tutional in December of 1994, it acknowledged 
that the legislation represented a "major policy 
shift." That "the magnitude of change con-
tained in the act generated such a firestorm of 
protest in a number of areas is not surprising," 
concluded the court.Z3 
TAXATION AND THE 1992 SCHOOL 
FINANCE FORMULA 
The 1992 formula for school finance levied 
a blanket 32-mill tax on all assessed property 
in the state. The taxes are turned over to the 
state of Kansas for disbursement to local dis-
tricts, using a formula calling for $3600 per 
full-time student to be returned to the dis-
tricts. General funds of the state subsidize the 
new package via sales, income, and mineral 
taxes. Under the previous formula, local dis-
tricts had had the responsibility to levy their 
own property taxes, and the poorer districts 
received subsidies from the state. A 32 mill 
levy shifts tax burdens throughout the state. 
Property poor districts with high enrollments 
saw major decreases in local tax obligations. 
Districts such as Chanute, Spring Hill, and 
Newton, in central and eastern Kansas, which 
had mill levies near or over 90 in the early 
1990s, benefitted from the 1992 legislation. 24 
Property rich districts, such as Hugoton, 
Lakin, and Rolla, which had had mill levies 
below 25 and enrollments under 900, saw in-
creases in property taxes. I t could be argued 
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that property rich districts, such as Hugoton, 
could easily withstand the increase in the mill 
levy. The increases would not be drastic ex-
cept in a few isolated districts, such as Mos-
cow, where the levy more than doubled. 
Southwest Kansans, though, saw the formula 
as exploitive. They were bitter over the large 
amount of private property in eastern Kansas 
that has been exempted from taxes to spur 
economic development and especially with the 
new spending limit of $3600 per student. 
Most districts in southwest Kansas have 
relatively few students drawn from relatively 
large areas. They traditionally had spent much 
more per student than their eastern, more ur-
ban counterparts. In 1991 the districts of 
Moscow and Mullinville spent nearly $10,000 
per student. 25 Local school boards wanted the 
best facilities and equipment, and they wanted 
to attract quality instructors and to offer pro-
grams such as foreign languages that have to 
be brought to rural schools via expensive sat-
ellite and fiber optic networks. High transpor-
tation costs for activities, demanded by the 
long distances from school to school, also raised 
per pupil spending. Southwest Kansans proudly 
maintained their generous spending with small 
mill levies and with minimal or no state aid. 
Good schools were, and remain, a source of 
local pride. 
Patrons screamed at the 1992 formula not 
only because of the loss of tax monies in the 
southwest districts but more on account of 
their inability to spend their own money. They 
saw that districts of equal size in eastern Kan-
sas, such as Dexter in Cowley County, had 
levied five to six times the amount of taxes on 
their patrons and spent nearly $3000 less per 
student. 26 The earlier tax formula had been 
unfair to Dexter students, but the new one 
simply seemed to reverse the injustice. IfMos-
cow and Dexter each had to operate on $3600 
per student, Moscow patrons would now sub-
sidize districts like Dexter at the expense of 
their own students. Moscow's budget would 
be slashed from $1.3 million to just over 
$500,000. For southwest Kansans the new for-
mula introduced new inequities, even though 
it had been praised in Topeka as equalizing 
educational opportunities across the state. 
Some relief appeared in amendments to the 
plan in 1993, including incentives for rural 
districts, such as the option to assess addi-
tiona 1 local tax monies up to 25 percent of the 
budget, transportation subsidies, and low en-
rollment weighting. The added incentives, 
however, did not mollify districts and patrons 
in the southwest. 
Tax exemptions in eastern Kansas further 
angered the southwesterners. Many compa-
nies in eastern Kansas, mostly in urban areas 
such as Wichita and Topeka, are left off the 
property tax rolls. Over the last few decades, 
municipalities have been issuing industrial 
revenue bonds, or tax exemptions, to spur 
companies to build or expand, thus revitaliz-
ing local economies. The recipients start with 
giants such as Boeing, of Wichita, and go on 
and on. The value of these exemptions is quite 
large. For example, Sedgwick, the state's larg-
est county, lists nearly $2 billion worth of 
taxable property but just shy of $3 billion of 
property not taxed-nearly one and one half 
times the valuation of the county and ten 
times the total valuation of Stevens County, 
the southwest's wealthiest. Of the state's 
nearly $20 billion in valuation, $4.76 billion 
are exempted from taxation, and almost 100 
percent of the exemptions lie east of Hut-
chinson. 27 
The above numbers are startling to south-
west Kansans. The property and mineral wealth 
of their home region is greatly overshadowed 
by the accumulation of untaxed property to 
the east. Southwest Kansans have argued that 
they could have given abatements to North-
ern Natural, Colorado Interstate, and the other 
natural gas companies that employ thousands 
in the southwest. They have not, and they do 
not feel they should have to subsidize eastern 
urban areas that have. To suggest that they 
cut their local school's spending because of 
someone else's abatements is unacceptable to 
them. 
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FIG. 4. Per-capita tax obligations for the new school finance formula. Secession leaders argued that the southwest 
part of the state was going to pay a disproportionate amount of taxes with the new formula, and proved it with this 
graph (Morton County Data Processing 1992). 
With the 1992 school finance formula, the 
eastern half of Kansas saved more than $300 
million in property taxes, receiving 83 per-
cent of all tax relief. Western Kansas saved 
roughly $67 million, and the southwest dis-
tricts saw actual increases in their mill lev-
ies. 28 The 1992 school finance formula includes 
a combination of property, income, mineral, 
and sales taxes. When looking at the per-capita 
distribution of taxes for the formula, one might 
expect that the contributions of sales and in-
come taxes to the formula by the more popu-
lous eastern school districts would counter 
larger property taxes of the southwest districts. 
To the contrary, in the plan the average Kan-
san is obligated to about $1000 in total taxes 
per year (Fig. 4). Sedgwick County, home of 
massive tax abatements, is about average. 
Stevens County taxpayers, in contrast, are 
obligated to more than $5500 per head to fund 
the new formula and Kearny, Grant, and 
Morton counties all have obligations of more 
than $3000 per person. 29 
The key to the school tax issue is that the 
high-value land in southwest Kansas is inhab-
ited by few people. Tax obligations are there-
fore more than three times higher there than 
they are in the rest of the state. If Sedgwick 
County did not abate several industries, its 
obligation would be nearly $2500 per person 
under the formula, and if all abatements were 
abolished, southwest Kansas would not see so 
great a tax punch. In that case the blanket 
mill levy could be reduced and still raise ad-
equate funds. 
Loss OF CONTROL 
The combination of cuts in funding and 
increases in total taxes is reason enough for 
bitterness in southwest Kansas. What seems 
more important to local people, though, is loss 
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of control over their schools, and by exten-
sion, their lives. With the new formula, the 
state will regulate tax rates and virtually set 
school budgets, traditional prerogatives of lo-
cal school boards. State-mandated budget cuts 
could produce cuts in salaries, athletic pro-
grams, and capital improvements that would 
be felt by entire communities. Dallas Bressler, 
a Morton County Commissioner and resident 
of the Rolla school district, has said simply, 
"The amount of money we're paying [as a re-
sult of the new mill levy] isn't the problem. 
The problem is the state telling us what we 
can and cannot do. "30 
Funding and control of local schools are 
powerful and emotional issues in southwest 
Kansas, but their loss has brought fears of 
even more drastic measures. Notions of school 
district consolidation have been floating 
throughout the statehouse in recent years 
and, with the 1992 finance package, came a 
report by the Special Committee on Assess-
ment and Taxation on the consolidation of 
small, rural districts. Representative David 
Goosen, R-Goessel, noted that with the 1992 
finance package and with further audits of the 
system "there will be a push for school con-
solidation" to rid smaller districts of excessive 
costs and create larger, more efficient districts. 
Such consolidations would probably occur in 
every county in southwest Kansas and be popu-
lar in Topeka. 31 Most southwest districts, their 
identity tied to their schools, would be reluc-
tant to consolidate. As Bressler says, suc-
cinctly, "I'm in a little dinky town out here-
population SOO-and if the school closes, the 
town closes. It's all over."32 
Consolidation of school districts could be 
the prelude to county consolidation and fur-
ther loss of local control. For several years the 
state has been looking at the economics of 
running smaller counties. A 1991 study by 
Kansas, Inc., of the resources of counties with 
fewer than 10,000 inhabitants showed that 
most of them rely on some state subsidies. 
According to Charles Warren, then president 
of the company, "the state can no longer af-
ford to subsidize county government for so few" 
because "it is not fair to expect the other state 
residents [43 counties with more than 10,000 
population] already burdened by their own 
local governments, to foot the bill."33 This view 
is not taken kindly in the southwest, where 
only Finney, Ford, and Seward counties have 
more than 10,000 people. 
Morton County commissioners issued a 
three-page statement bluntly refuting the 
study: "Warren has an uncanny knack of twist-
ing figures to suit his own biased viewpoints." 
They also noted that everyone of the mem-
bers of Kansas, Inc. 's, board of directors lives 
east of Wichita. In many ways, the Morton 
County leaders are right. Given their high land 
values and mineral wealth, southwestern coun-
ties can be self sufficient if a reasonable public 
policy is established. The commissioners fin-
ished their letter by noting that "if consolida-
tion must occur, begin with consolidation at 
the top,"34 echoing the traditional discontent 
with the statehouse in Topeka. The arguments 
against county consolidation are emotional 
ones dealing with community identity. Local 
people agree that "a greater county allegiance 
exists on the High Plains than in America as a 
whole."]5 Administrative attempts to consoli-
date such institutions as hospitals and law 
enforcement have been futile in southwestern 
Kansas, so a political union between, say, 
Grant and Stanton counties would be ex-
tremely unpopular. 
THE PAST AND THE FUTURE 
Despite the strong allegiance to schools, 
counties, and the region, the 1992 secession 
movement ended rather quickly, as had the 
earlier ones. The real differences between the 
southwest and the rest of Kansas remain, how-
ever, as do issues of school control and unfair 
taxation. The Kansas Education Coalition, a 
group of ISO rural Kansas districts, many from 
the southwest, continues to protest the 1992 
legislation and to lobby for local control and 
less budget control, though their arguments 
have been met with state mandated increases 
in property taxes. 
Other potential problems loom for the 
southwest. Two major sources of wealth in the 
area-natural gas and water for irrigation-
are terminal. The local water table in many 
areas has already fallen drastically since the 
time of settlement. Small family farms and 
ranches, historical mainstays in the region, 
have mostly given way to larger family and 
corporate operations, and "as farms grow larger, 
fewer, and more mechanized, fewer people are 
needed to maintain them. "36 Though cattle-
related industries have brought economic 
booms to Garden City, Dodge City, and Lib-
eral, such industry is not only low-skilled and 
physically demanding but also water depen-
dent and thus endangered. 
Depopulation of the truly rural portions of 
southwest Kansas also continues. County seats 
and areas with access to ground water seem to 
be the only localities gaining or even retain-
ing population. 37 Although several of the 
secession-minded counties are gaining popu-
lation, limited resources in the region suggest 
that this growth cannot be sustained. With 
the depletion of water, and eventually natural 
gas, it appears that the current way of life of 
the High Plains "is dying a natural, inevitable 
death."3~ 
The end of the current lifestyle in the re-
gion was foreshadowed by Frank and Deborah 
Popper in 1987 when they brought forth the 
idea of the "Buffalo Commons." Although the 
idea of the High Plains as desert has been part 
of American lore since the early nineteenth 
century, these eastern predictors of the de-
population of the Great Plains seemed the ul-
timate doomsayers to inhabitants of southwest 
Kansas. Returning the marginal, waterless, 
eroded land to the buffalo and pronghorn is 
even more threatening than the notion of 
Topeka taking over the schools. It could be 
that this threat will materialize just as the lat-
ter has, and that attempts to secede from the 
future could be as futile as the attempt to se-
cede from the state. 
Southwest Kansans understand their 
lifestyle is in jeopardy. Deep down they prob-
ably would agree with the Poppers that "the 
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small towns in the ... countryside will wither 
and die. The rural Plains will be virtually de-
serted."'9 Several small towns in the south-
west corner of Kansas fulfill the Poppers' 
prediction, yet they are still home to a few, 
proud, die-hard people, many of whom were 
integral to the 1992 secession movement. 
These Kansans have a distinct identity-an 
attachment to their land, an independence, a 
camaraderie with adjacent areas on the High 
Plains, and a hostility toward the east-that 
will probably endure for some time. 
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